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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is readily apparent that the instant case is considerably out of
line with the authority as outlined above. The fact set-up seems to
furnish adequate basis, in connection with the bank's insolvency, for
protecting the equities of depositors, creditors, and other stockholders.
The distinction pointed out by the court between the instant case
and Corporation Commissioner v. McLean"o would, in accordance
with authority, 8 1 further impeach the result of the instant case. The
court's reliance on the fact that the defrauding bank president would
profit -by his own fraud-described by the court as "the egg that
spoils the omelet"--is, from the standpoint of innocent creditors,
as unsatisfactory as it is unique. The court sems to have disregarded
entirely the plain wording, as well as the evident intent of the North
Carolina "double liability" statute.3 2
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.

Banks and Banking-Power of Banks to Pledge Assets to
Secure Depositors.
Plaintiff railroad had deposited its funds in defendant national
bank on condition that the bank should furnish corporate surety
bonds, which it did. While the bank was still solvent, it induced the
railroad to accept a substitution of Liberty bonds owned by the bank
for the surety bonds which secured the deposit. The bank failed,
and this action is against the receiver who has failed to surrender the
Liberty bonds. Held: The action cannot be maintained; the agreement by which the bank pledged some of its assets to secure private
funds was beyond the power of the bank, and unenforceable.'
- 202 N. C. 77, 161 S. E. 854 (1932). The tenor of this case is distinctly

in accord with the stricter view: "It is only when it is shown that a person
whose name appears on the books of the corporation as a stockholder, is not
in fact an owner of stock, that such person is not subject to the statutory
liability. . . The only issues of fact which may be raised by such appeal
and determined in the Superior Court, ordinarily, are: (1) Was the appellant
a stockholder of the insolvent banking corporation at the date of his assessment? (2) If so, how many shares of the capital stock of said corporation did
appellant own at said date? . . . Having received all the benefits arising
from the ownership from stock ... it is not unjust that they should now bear
their share of the burden imposed by law upon them by reason of their ownership of said stock."
' See note 8 supra.
2 Supra note 21.
The case is perhaps supportable by North Carolina authority dealing with corporations other than banks. Chamberlain v. Trogden,
148 N. C. 140, 61 S. E. 628 (1908).
A recent enactment, P. L. 1933, ch. 159, provides for a surplus fund in
lieu of the additional liability imposed upon bank stockholders. The statute
is mandatory as to banks organized after its ratification, and those then in
operation are given the option of coming within its provisions.
'Texas & P. R. Co. v. Pottorff, 63 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
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The principal case and a prior case arising out of the failure of
the same bank but involving the pledging of assets to secure public
deposits, which pledge was upheld, 2 illustrate the distinction which
courts often make between pledges securing private, and those securing public, deposits. It is generally conceded that a bank has the
power to borrow money and to secure the obligation by pledging its
assets,3 and some courts have made no distinction between a loan
4
and a deposit since a debtor-creditor relationship arises in both cases.
5
Other courts have rejected the loan analogy, and have refused to
sustain the pledges as an implied or incidental power of the bank. 6
'Pottorff v. El Paso-Hudspeth Counties Road Dist., 62 F. (2d) 498
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
'Auten v. U. S. Nat. Bk. of N. Y., 174 U. S. 125, 19 Sup. Ct. 628, 43 L. ed.
920 (1899); Citizens Bk. v. Bk. of Waddy, 126 Ky. 169, 103 S. W. 249
(1907) ; Carter v. Brock, 162 La. 12, 110 So. 71 (1926) ; Cantley v. Little R.
Drainage Dist., 2 S. W. (2d) 607 (Mo. 1928); Schumacker v. Eastern Bk.
& Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; Bulton v. Sanguinetti, 11
Pac. (2d) 1085 (Ariz. 1932) ; 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANxING (6th ed. 1928)
§§48 and 63. Controversy has recently arisen over the power of the receiver
of an insolvent bank to borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation by pledging assets. North Carolina, in Bales v. Hood, 203 N. C. 56,
164 S. E. 828 (1932), held that an equity court through its general authority
over receivers could authorize such a pledge. Utah, in Riches v. Hadlock,
15 Pac. (2d) 283 (1932), held that the state statute took away from the courts
such power in the case of insolvent banks. It will be perceived that neither
court bases its decision upon the power of the bank to borrow money, but
solely upon the power of an equitable or statutory receiver.
'Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 (1880); Williams v. Hall, 30 Ariz. 581;
249 Pac. 755 (1926). In Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. E.
795 (1926), Connor, J., in a dictum said: "The relation between the bank
and its depositor is that of debtor and creditor; we perceive no distinction on
principle between one who deposits money -with a bank, subject to check,
and one who loans money to the bank for a definite time, as regards this
question. There is no statute in this State forbidding a transfer or assignment by a bank of its property as security for one who is a depositor in the
bank. Whether a sound pliblic policy forbids such transfer or assignment
must be determined by the General Assembly and not by this court." At
the 1933 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly, House Bill No.
401, providing, "Any baik or banking institution authorized by law to receive
deposits, if in the judgmgent of its board of directors or its executive comImittee
it is advisable and to the best interests of such banking institutions. to
do so, is authorized to secure and protect its liability to any depositor by
pledging for such purpose such of its assets as may be designated by its
board of directors or executive committee . . . ," received an unfavorable

committee report. Thus, it would seem that the North Carolina General
Assembly has indirectly disapproved such a pledge to secure a private deposit.
5 Hunt v. Hopley, 120 Iowa 695, 95 N. W. 205 (1903); Divide County v.
Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236 (1926), 51 A. L. R. 296 (1927); State
Bank v. School Dist., 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W. 163 (1928), 65 A. L. R.
1407 (1930); Farmers' & Merchants' Bk. v. School Dist., 174 Minn. 286,
219 N. W. 163 (1928).
0 Commercial Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens Tr. & G. Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W.
160 (1913), 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 950 (1913),.Divide County v. Baird, ,upra
note 5.
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Pledges to secure public deposits are often permitted by statute,
either directly by giving the authority to the bank,7 or indirectly by
8
authorizing the public officials to deposit only upon taking security.
In the absence -of statute, the decided weight of authority is that a
bank, state or national, has the power to pledge its assets to secure a
public deposit, 9 or to indemnify the sureties upon a bond given to
secure such deposits.'o Of course, a valid pledge may not be made
City of Portland v. St. Bk. of Portland, 107 Ore. 267, 214 Pac. 813 (1923) ;
Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 113 Atl. 551 (1926) ; Cameron v. Alleghaney
County Home, 287 Pa. 326, 135 AtI. 133 (1926) ; Schormick v. Butler, 172 N. E.
181 (Ind. 1930); Bliss v. Mason, 237 N. W. 581 (Neb. 1931). As to the
power of national banks, see 12 U. S. C. A. §90, as amended June 25, 1930.
'First Am. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900 (1928);
Pixton v. Perry, 269 Pac. 114 (Utah, 1928); Huntsville Tr. Co. v. Noel,
12 S. W. (2d) 751 (Mo. 1928); Tyrrell County v. Holloway, 182 N. C. 64,
108 S. E. 337 (1921) ; Page Tr. Co. v. Rose, supra note 4; Hood v. Board of
Financial Control, 203 N. C. 119, 164 S.E. 831 (1932). That the situation
in North Carolina for such deposits may shortly be changed can be seen from
the following: "A bill to permit member banks of the Federal Reserve System to accept deposits of State, County and Municipal governmental units
without having to post depository bonds or other security was passed by the
Senate yesterday and sent to the House of Representatives. However, the
bill is contingent upon the passage of pending legislation in Congress which
would have the Federal Government guarantee 100 per cent. payment of
such deposits in member banks:' Raleigh News and Observer, May 3,
1933,
at 2.
9
Richard v. Osceola Bk., 79 Iowa 707, 45 S.W. 294 (1890) ; Williams v.
Hall, s=pra note 4; Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 113 Atl. 551 (1926) ;
Andrew v. Adebolt Savings Bk., 203 Iowa 1335, 214 N. W. 559 (1927);
Austin v. Lamar County, 11 S. W. (2d) 553 (Tex. 1928); Williams v. Earhart, 34 Ariz. 565, 273 Pac. 728 (1929) ; Application of Broderick, 252 N. Y.
Supp. 68 (1931) ; In re Bank of Spencerport, 255 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1932) ;
Sneeden v. City of Marion, 58 F. (2d) 341 (E. D. Pa. 1932). Contra: Divide
County v. Baird, supra note 5; Farmers' & Merchants' Bk. v. School Dist.,
supra note 5; Ark.-La. Highway Co. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S.W. (2d)
533 (1928), noted in (1928) 42 HARV. L. Rav. 272; Foster v. City of Longview, 26 S.W. (2d) 1059) (Tex. 1930); Wood v. Imperial Irr. Dist. 17 Pac.
(2d) 28 (Cal. 1933); Bliss v. Pathfinder Irr. Dist., 122 Neb. 303, 240 N. W.
291 (1932).
Since this comment was written, two cases of interest have been decided.
In Sneeden, Rec'r., v. City of Marion, 64 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), it
was held that an Illinois national bank did not have power to pledge certain
of its assets to secure the deposits of a city operating under the commission
form of government. But Mays v. Bd. of Comm'rs., Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 20269,
May 16, 1933, (1933) U. S. WEEKLY L. J. 262, held that "national banks are
empowered to pledge assets to secure deposits of public funds without specific
statutory authority therefor, since such power is incidental to the banking
business."
" McFerson v. Nat. Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923) ; Page
Tr. Co. v. Rose, supra note 4; U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Village of Bassfield, 148
Miss. 109, 114 So. 26 (1927); Ainsworth v. Kruger, 80 Mont. 468, 260 Pac.
1055 (1927); Grigsby v. People's Bank, 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W. (2d) 673
1928); Melaven v. Hunker, 299 Pac. 1075 (N. M. 1931); cf. Mothersead v.
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 22 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), certiorari
denied, 276 U. S. 637, 48 Sup. Ct. 421, 72 L. ed. 744 (1927). Contra: Corn-
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after the bank has become insolvent, since it would amount to an
unlawful preference."
Questions as to the validity of pledges to secure private deposits
have not reached the appellate courts nearly so often as have those
involving public deposits. Many states prohibit private pledges by
statute. 12 Where there are no statutes, most of the early cases uphold private pledges ;13 but later decisions are practically unanimous
14
in holding that such pledges are against public policy and void.
The question did not arise as to a national bank until 1931, and then
in a strong opinion the court held such a pledge void. 15 The principal case follows and approves that case.
The arguments most often advanced against allowing assets to be
pledged by the bank are: (1) to allow pledging gives extra protection
to the secured at the expense of the unsecured ;16 (2) the public is
deceived by the financial statements which seldom, if ever, state that
assets are pledged ;'7 (3) the pledgee, if a large depositor, is given a
mercial Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens Tr. & G. Co., supra note 6; Schornick v.
Butler, 172 N. E. 181 (Ind. 1930).
'Rice v. City of Columbia, 143 S. C. 516, 141 S. E. 705 (1928) ; Farmers
Savings Bk. v. Bergin, 52 S. D. 1, 216 N. W. 597 (1927), aff'd on rehearing,
53 S. D. 296, 220 N. W. 859 (1928) ; Parks v. Knapp, 29 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928), certiorari denied, 278 U. S. 660, 49 .Sup. Ct. 250, 73 L. ed. 567
(1929) ; cf. City of Louisville v. Columbia Tr. Co., 245 Ky. 704, 54 S. W. (2d)
40 (1932) ; Hood v. Board of Financial Control, supra note 8 (pledge upheld
on ground public officials had no notice).
'IDAHO
CoD (1932) §25-507; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1929) §7699-14;
N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) §5191A 1; S. D. Laws 1919, c. 124, p.
109; OMn. CODE ANN. (1930) §22-801; UTAH ComP. LAws (1917) §1006;
KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923), c. 9, §142.
'Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pac. 319 (1877) ; Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 (1880);
Bank of Chautauqua v. First National Bank of Sedan, 98 Kan. 109, 157 Pac.
392 (1916) ; Ex parte Dist. Grand Lodge, 147 S. C. 103, 144 S. E. 841 (1928) ;
Peurifoy v. Westminster Loan Co., 148 S. C. 100, 145 S. E. 706 (1928)
(question of power was apparently not raised in either of the South Carolina cases).
,Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522,
263 Pac. 632 (1928); Bait. & 0. Ry. v. Smith, 48 F. (2d) 861 (W. D. Pa.
1931), aff'd, 56 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932). See Carter v. Brocks, 162
La. 12, 110 So. 71, 73 (1926).
' Bait. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Smith, supra note 14, with comment (1932) 41
YALE: L. J. 1076.
"Commercial
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens tr. & G. Co., supra fiote 6.
'7 Divide County v. Baird, supra note 5; Grigsby v. People's Bank, supra
note 10, where the court suggested that it was the duty of the banking department to require such pledges to be stated in reports. However, unless published, the depositing public might still be deceived, and, if published, such a
statement might prove disastrous to the bank, as suggested in Commercial Bk.
& Tr. Co. v. Citizens Tr. & T. Co., supra note 6.
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power over the bank which is undesirable. 18 It is believed that the
courts are increasingly accepting these reasons as outweighing the
rather vague notion of "superior public rights" under which such
pledges to the public have been sustained, and that there is even less
reason for sustaining the pledges to secure private depositors. Expressions of doubt, and often of open disapproval, are coming from
the courts, as well as from commentators, as to the validity of allowing assets to be pledged whether to secure a public depositor or a
private depositor.' 9
The- banks themselves are becoming increasingly interested. At
the recent meeting of the executive council of the American Bankers'
Association the following was placed in the program for banking reform: "Deposits of public funds in banks should have the same
status as private deposits, and should not be accorded special and
additional security."' 20 It is submitted that such a plan is desirable
from the standpoint of sound banking, and would benefit the banks,
the depositors, and the public.
HERMAN S. MERRELL.

Bankruptcy-Compositions-A Suggestion fox Federal
Legislation.
In these days of economic stress it has become highly desirable
to find some method, less disastrous to the debtor than bankruptcy,
of relieving the insolvent debtor of his excessive debts. On first
appearance it would seem that the common law composition with
creditors might go a long way toward meeting this demand.
A common law composition with creditors is an agreement between an insolvent debtor and two or more of his creditors,' whereby
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens Tr. and G. Co., upra note 6.
'Commercial

The courts seldom mention this reason. However, it is believed to be a
material one, since a large depositor, heavily secured, would be in a position
largely to dictate to the bank. On the other hand, large corporations doing
business in numerous localities may refuse to patronize the smaller local
banks unless given security. The best remedy for this situation, under present banking laws, seems to be to permit surety bonds without a pledge, which
only decrease the amount of the bank's profits instead of actually taking away
general assets upon which all depositors have a right to rely equally. See
Cobp. Ass'n v. First State Bank, 168 Minn. 28, 209 N. W. 631 (1926).
"See Balt. & 0. Ry. v. Smith, supra note 14, at 867; Schumacker v. Eastern Bk. & Tr. Co., supra note 3 at 927. Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
608; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 916; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1076; (1932) 10
NEB. L. BULL. 327; (1928) 2 DAK. L. REv. 68.
THE TARHmL BANKER, May, 1933, at 30; TIME, April 24, 1933, at 47.
1Schroeder v. Pissis, 128 Cal. 209, 60 Pac. 758 (1900) ("It is not necessary
that all the creditors of a debtor should sign a composition agreement in order

